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I 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this Appeal are the Plaintiff/Appellant, Bonnie 
Kay Harris, and the Defendant/Appellee, Theresa Gutierrez Spivey, 
aka Theresa Spivey. 
Also named as defendants in the case at the trial court level 
were Utah Retirement Systems and the Estate of Glendon G. Spivey, 
deceased. Neither of those defendants submitted anything in the 
trial court proceedings or this appeal, except the Utah Retirement 
Systems submitted a Stipulation signed by all parties named in the 
trial court case and an order was signed by the Utah Court of 
Appeals dated 21 February, 1996, formally dismissing Utah 
Retirement Systems from the appeal. 
1 
II 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 4 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 5 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 6 
Issues of Law 6 
Issues of Fact 6 
DETERMINATIVE CASES 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 7 
A. Nature of the Case 7 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 8 
C. Disposition of Case at Trial Level 9 
D. Statement of Facts 10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 12 
ARGUMENT 13 
POINT 1 13 
The Trial Court Correctly Concluded That 
Appellant-Bonnie Harris' Petition To Modify 
Divorce Decree Was Barred By the Doctrine 
Of Laches 13 
POINT II 15 
The Trial Court Correctly Concluded As a 
Matter Of Law That Appellant-Harris' Petition 
Was Barred by the Doctrine of Res Judicata 
(Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 
(Utah App.1988) 15 
2 
POINT III 20 
The Trial Court Correctly Concluded As A 
Matter of Law A Divorce Decree Cannot Be 
Modified After the Death of One of the 
Spouses 20 
POINT IV 21 
Appellant-Harris1 Petition to Modify does not 
Allege Or Show Changed Circumstances 21 
CONCLUSION 24 
CROSS-APPEAL ON ATTORNEY FEES 25 
Defendant Theresa 6. Spivey Should Be Awarded 
Attorney Fees Under Rule 11, Sanctions and 
Utah Code 78-27-56 25 
Conclusion on Cross-Appeal 26 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 27 
ADDENDUM 
3 
Ill 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: Page No. 
Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 
(Utah 1993) 6 
Carpenter v. Carpenter. 722 P.2d 230, 150 Ariz. 52 
(Ariz. 1986) 19 
Clark v. Chipman. 212 Kan 259, 510 P. 2d 1257, 1266 
(Kansas 1973) 15 
Cremins v. Simonds. 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981) 6 
Parrel1 v. Porter. 830 P. 2d 299, 301 
(Utah App. 1992) 20 
P.P.I.e. v. C. Goldy Limousine. 810 P Supp 1124, 
1127 (D. Col. 1993) 15 
Gale v. Gale. 123 Utah 277, 258 P.2d 986 (Utah 1953).. 21 
Guffev v. LaChance. 127 Ariz 140, 618 P. 2d 634 
(Ariz Ct. App. 1980) 16 
Jacobsen Inv. Co. v. State Tax Commission. 839 P.2d 
789, 790 (Utah 1992) 6 
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen. 703 P. 2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985).. 16 
Jensen v. Brown. 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981) 6 
Karren v. Karren. 25 Utah 87, 69 P. 465 (Utah 1902)... 21 
Mostrong v. Jackson. 866 P. 2d 573, 577 
(Utah App. 1993) 6 
Nelson v. Davis. 592 P. 2d 594, 597 (Utah 1979) 20 
Qsmus v. Osmus. 114 Utah 216, 198 P.2d 233 
(Utah 1948) 21 
Ostler v. Ostler. 789 P.2d 7113 (Utah App. 1990) 7, 17 
Papanikolas Bros. Enters v. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center. 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975) 13 
Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978) 18 
4 
Sorenson v. Kennecott - Utah Copper Corp,. 873 P.2d 
1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994) 8 
Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494,136 P.2d 957(Utah 1943). 18 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 
(Utah App. 1988) 7, 15, 
16/ 17, 
18, 19 
Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch.Inc. 
758 P.2d 451 19 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 
870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993) 6 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) 13, 19 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended Section 49-1-103(15)••• 22 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended Section 49-1-606(1).... 22 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended Section 78-2a-3(2)(i)•• 5 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended Section 78-27-56 25 
U.S. National Retirement Equity Act of 1984 23 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 25 
Treatises and Other: 
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, Section 492 14 
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, Section 494 21 
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. West Pub. Co. 1951 
Page 1361 18 
IV 
JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-2a-3(2) (i), Utah Code Ann. 
1953, as amended. 
5 
V 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows: 
Issues of Law: 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the necessary 
elements were present in this case so that Mrs. Harris1 Petition 
was barred by the doctrine of laches? 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that the necessary 
elements were present in this case so that Mrs. Harris' Petition 
was barred by the doctrine of res judicata? 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that Mrs. Harris 
had not shown a substantial change in her circumstances since the 
Divorce Decree had been entered? 
Standard of Review for Issues of Fact: 
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard. Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 
1286 (Utah 1993); Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P. 
2d 1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994); Mostrona v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 
577 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied, -P.2d- (Utah 1994); Cremins v. 
Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981); Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 
(Utah 1981). 
Standard of Review for Issues of Law: 
A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed 
for correctness which is also referred to as a "correction of error 
standard." United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 
870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Jacobsen Inv. Co. v. State Tax 
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Commission, 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah 1992). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(A) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Fifteen years after divorce and three months after the death 
of the husband (Glendon 6. Spivey), the ex-wife (Appellant-
Plaintiff, Bonnie Harris) filed a petition in this action (District 
Court Civil No. 9544400677) against the second wife, 
Appellee/Defendant, Theresa Spivey, to modify the property division 
in the decree in prior divorce action (District Court Civil No. 
53,289) which was entered in 1980, to obtain retirement benefits of 
the deceased husband. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss 
filed by the deceased husband's second wife, Theresa Gutierrez 
Spivey. The ex-wife, Plaintiff-Bonnie Harris has appealed the 
trial court's ruling. Appellee/Defendant, Theresa Spivey, has 
cross-appealed the issue of the trial court denying her request for 
attorney fees. 
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04/24/95 Plaintiff R.10 
05/01/95 Def/Spivey R.21 
(B) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Pleading Description Filed Date Filed By Record No. 
1. Petition to Modify Divorce Decree 03/31/95 Plaintiff R.7 
2. Summons served 4/10/95 on Theresa 
6. Spivey. 
3. Motion to Dismiss Petition to 
Modify Divorce 
4. Memorandum of Points and Author-
ethos in Support of Theresa 6. 
Spivey*s Motion to Dismiss 05/01/95 Def/Spivey R.38 
5. Affidavit of Theresa G. Spivey 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss 05/01/95 Def/Spivey R.46 
6. Motion to have case assigned to 
Judge Park 
7. Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Have Case assigned 
to Judge Park 
8. Memorandum in Opposition to 
Theresa G. Spivey"s Motion 
to Dismiss 
9. Reply to Memorandum in Opposition 
to have Case Assigned to Judge 
Park 
10.Affidavit of Vernon L. Snow in 
Support of Motion to Assign case 
to Judge Park 
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05/01/95 Def/Spivey R.18 
05/08/95 Plaintiff R.53 
05/14/95 Plaintiff R.142 
05/15/95 Def/Spivey R.58 
0515/95 Def/Spivey R.61 
11.Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Dismiss Petition 
to Modify Divorce Decree 05/19/95 Def/Spivey R.84 
12.Minute Entry-matter certified to 
the Honorable Anthony W. Schofield 05/22/95 Court R.84 
13.Affidavit in Support of Petition 
to Modify Divorce Decree 05/24/95 Plaintiff R/96 
14.Notice to Submit for Decision-
Motion to Dismiss Petition to 
Modify Divorce Decree 06/02/95 Def/Spivey R.100 
15.Transcript in Support of Petition 
to Modify Divorce Decree 06/07/95 Plaintiff R.108 
16.Documentation in Support of 
Petition to Modify Divorce 
Decree 
17.Objection to Unauthorized Filings 
18.Ruling of Judge Schofield 
19.Order of Dismissal 
20.Affidavit of Impecuniosity 
21.Notice of Appeal 
22.Notice of Cross Appeal 
06/16/95 
06/19/95 
06/20/95 
07/20/95 
08/16/95 
08/17/95 
09/29/95 
Plaintiff 
Def/Spivey 
Court 
Def/Spivey 
Plaintiff 
Plaintiff 
Def/Spivey 
R.122 
R.155 
R.153 
R.160 
R.162 
R.164 
R.169 
C. DISPOSITION OF CASE AT TRIAL LEVEL 
The trial court dismissed the Petition to Modify Divorce 
Decree finding: 
1. Laches bars litigation concerning the distribution of the 
retirement benefits as is more fully set forth in the court's 
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Ruling dated June 20, 1995. (R.160, 153.) 
2. Res judicata bars litigation concerning the distribution of 
the retirement benefits as more fully set forth in the court's 
Ruling dated June 20, 1995. (R.160,153.) 
3. A divorce decree cannot be modified in a separate action 
brought after the death of one of the spouses as is more fully set 
forth in the court's Ruling dated June 20, 1995, (R.160. 153.) 
4. An award of attorney fees to Defendant/Theresa Spivey was 
denied. (R.160,153.) dated June 20, 1995. (R.160, 153.) 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Glendon G. Spivey (sometimes hereafter referred to as 
decedent) and Plaintiff-Bonnie Harris were married May 5, 
1962.(R.6#8.) 
2. Plaintiff-Harris and decedent were divorced May 15, 1980, 
in case no. 53,289, District Court of Utah County, State of Utah. 
The decree of divorce was granted after a trial in which both 
plaintiff and Glendon G. Spivey were represented by counsel. 
Plaintiff was represented by Brent D. Young, Attorney. (R.1,2,3,6.) 
Decedent was represented by attorney Thomas Taylor. (R.22.) 
3. Financial Declarations were filed in the original divorce 
action by Plaintiff (R.27-24.), and Glendon G. Spivey. (R. 24-22.) 
4. The divorce decree entered May 15, 1980, is silent as to 
any distribution of retirement funds or 401k or 457 plans. (R.3.) 
5. Subsequent to the divorce Plaintiff-Bonnie Harris married 
Craig J. Harris on November 7, 1982. (R.45.) Glendon G. Spivey (now 
deceased) married Defendant- Theresa Gutierrez on November 27, 
10 
1982.(R.45.) 
6. A son, Wade, was born to Glendon Spivey and Defendant-
Theresa G. Spivey on May 7, 1985. (R.45.) 
7. During the marriage between plaintiff and Glendon G. 
Spivey the plaint iff-Bonnie Harris worked for Signet ics. Glendon G. 
Spivey worked for Provo City. (R.45 #2 and 3.) 
8. According to the records of the Utah State Retirement 
Office, Glendon G. Spivey retired October 16, 1991, as an employee 
of the City of Provo. (R.39,40,41,44.) 
9. In 1990 and 1991, Glendon G. Spivey changed the 
beneficiaries on his retirement and 401K retirement plan. (R.39-42.) 
10. Glendon G. Spivey died on December 27, 1994, leaving as 
his surviving widow, Theresa Spivey (Appellee-Defendant), his wife 
of 12 years, and their son, Wade, then nine years of age who are 
the beneficiaries of his retirement benefit and his 4 OIK 
plan.(R.44 #9,and 39,40,41,44.) 
11. Defendant-Spivey and her son Wade Spivey are dependent on 
the monthly income received as beneficiaries of decedent-Glendon G. 
Spivey1s retirement pension and 401K plan to meet current and 
future health, welfare, education and living expenses, and will be 
seriously adversely affected should the pension and 401K plan be 
reduced or eliminated. (R.44 #13.) 
12. On December 29, 1994, Lisa Ann Spivey, daughter of the 
decedent from his marriage to Plaintiff-Harris signed a petition to 
have herself appointed Personal Representative in the Probate of 
Decedent's Estate. The petition was prepared by Charles A. Schultz, 
11 
the same attorney representing Plaintiff-Harris ((R.73.) 
13• On December 30, 1994, the foregoing petition to have Lisa 
Spivey appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Glendon 
G. spivey, deceased, was filed with the court almost two hours 
before the decedent's funeral. (Utah County case No. 943400572. (R. 
76,60,44#10.) 
14. On January 11, 1995, Appellee/Defendant-Theresa Spivey 
filed a Counter-Petition in the probate proceeding. Sidney S. 
Gilbert was subsequently appointed Personal representative of the 
Estate of Glendon G. Spivey, deceased on stipulation. (R.44.) 
15. On March 31, 1995, fifteen years after the divorce 
between Plaintiff and Glendon G. Spivey, and three months after 
Glendon1s death, Plaintiff filed this separate action, case no. 
954400677DA, seeking to modify the divorce decree dated May 15, 
1980, in case no. 53,289. (R.7.) 
16. Lisa Spivey, daughter of Plaintiff-Harris, is not only 
the original Petitioner in the probate case, but appears to be the 
secretary or assistant of Charles A. Schultz, the attorney for both 
Lisa Spivey and also Plaintiff-Harris. (R.60#4,75, and see various 
certificates of service of Appellant/Plaintiff-Harris.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree should be dismissed 
because: 
1. Glendon Spivey, a necessary party to modify the divorce is 
dead. 
2. Any modification of a divorce decree must be done in the 
12 
original proceeding and not in this, a separate proceeding. 
3. The original divorce decree is res judicata as to the 
ownership of the retirement funds and 401k plan under the holding 
in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988). 
4. Laches bar this suit 15 years after the divorce decree. 
5. Attorney fees should be imposed against Plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
I,THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT APPELLANT-BONNIE 
HARRIS' PETITION TO MODIFY DIVORCE DECREE WAS BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF LACHES. 
Judge Schofield succinctly sets forth the law of laches and 
its application in this case when he states at pages 3,4, and 5 of 
his ruling dated June 20, 1995, as follows: (R.151.) 
"•••Although few cases are resolved on the basis of laches, 
this is that unusual case where laches should apply. 
For laches to bar a claim two elements must exist. 
1. The lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff, and 
2. An injury to defendant owing to such lack of 
diligence. Papanikolas Bros, Enters. v. Suaarhouse 
Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975) 
Lack of diligence on the part of Bonnie seems obvious. 
She was divorced from Glendon in 1980. In Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court first 
ruled that retirement benefits are subject to division in a 
divorce action. That case was decided only two years after the 
divorce between Bonnie and Glendon and twelve years before his 
death. During that intervening twelve years Bonnie had ample 
time to bring any action she desired to determine any claim 
which she may have to Glendon's retirement benefits. 
Glendon and Theresa married in 1982, over twelve years 
before his death* During that intervening twelve years Bonnie 
surely must have wondered what retirement benefits Theresa may 
have from Glendon and what, if any, benefits she was entitled 
to from Glendon's retirement. 
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Further, Glendon retired in October 1991, over three 
years before his death and three and one-half years before 
Bonnie brought this modification petition. By that time it 
must have been clear that Glendon was receiving some of his 
retirement benefits and that she was not. Again, Bonnie had 
ample time to bring an action to determine her claim to his 
retirement benefits. 
These separate measures of the lack of diligence by 
Bonnie are persuasive. She did not act timely to assert her 
rights. Further, the prejudice to Theresa arising from 
Bonnie's delay also is clear. 
The decision of whether Bonnie or Theresa is entitled to 
Glendon*s retirement benefit is based, at least in part, upon 
Glendon1s decision made in December 1990 to change the 
beneficiary of his retirement plan, naming Theresa. His 
intent, decision and actions all are relevant and yet Glendon 
is not available to testify. He is deceased. His absence is 
complete and unavoidable. Had this action been instituted 
while he was alive, during any of the fifteen years that 
passed after the entry of the decree and his death, during any 
of the twelve years that passed after the Woodward decision 
and his death, during any of the twelve years after Theresa 
and Glendon married and his death, or even during the three 
years after his retirement and his death, he could have 
participated in the litigation. Now his participation is 
forever lost. 
Notwithstanding Bonnie's weak assertion to the contrary, 
for her to bring this action now, after Glendon had died 
places Theresa at a material and substantial disadvantage, a 
disadvantage that could have been avoided had Bonnie moved 
timely. That is the kind of prejudicial delay that a laches 
defense is all about. Bonnie has slept on her rights for at 
least three years, more likely twelve or fifteen years. She 
could have brought this action when a now unavailable, 
critical witness still was alive.(Footnote omitted.) 
This is the appropriate case for a laches defense. Bonnie 
had ample time to raise the issue she now raises only after 
Glendon's death. Theresa is in a changed position because of 
her marriage to Glendon, because of his retirement and because 
of his subsequent death. To permit litigation at this late 
date would be to her significant prejudice. Laches bars this 
action." 
24 Am Jur 2d states in Section 492, at page 521: 
"The party seeking to set aside a divorce decree may 
be barred by laches where he has been guilty of a lack of 
diligence in learning the facts or in seeking relief and 
14 
innocent third persons have acquired rights by or through 
the remarriage of the other spouse in the meantime. 
Plaintiff knew where Glendon worked. She had legal counsel in 
the divorce proceeding. A trial was held. All of the facts were 
available to her and her counsel. She knew Glendon had retired, 
yet she did nothing for 15 years. In the meantime, Glendon died 
and innocent persons- Theresa Spivey and Glendon and Theresa's son, 
Wade, will be adversely affected by Plaintiff's action. All the 
elements of laches exist, namely, (1) lack of diligence by the 
plaintiff against whom the defense is asserted and (2) prejudice to 
the party asserting the defense. P.P.I.e. vs. C. Goldy Limousine, 
810 P Supp 1124, 1127 (D. Col 1993); Clark vs. Chipman, 212 Kan 
259, 510 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Kansas 1973). 
II.THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
Plaintiff-HARRIS' PETITION WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES 
JUDICATA (THROCKMORTON V, THROCKMORTON, 767 P. 2d 121 (UTAH 
APP.1988). 
The present case involves a very similar factual situation and 
the same legal issues as Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, supra, which 
was decided by this court in 1988. 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, supra, involved a petition to 
modify a divorce decree filed by a former wife who had been married 
21 years to the husband. Throckmorton's had eight children. Mr. 
Throckmorton was a policeman. Mrs. Throckmorton did not work 
outside the home. (Plaintiff in the instant case worked outside the 
home for Signetics.) Ten years after the Throckmorton divorce Mrs. 
Throckmorton filed a petition in the divorce case seeking increased 
15 
alimony and a share of Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits. 
At page 122 of Throckmorton, supra, this Court stated: 
The trial court further held Mrs. Throckmorton's claim 
to her former husband's retirement benefits was barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata. 
This court in Throckmorton, supra, at page 123 discussed 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mrs. 
Throckmorton's claim to Mr. Throckmorton's retirement benefits 
stating: 
The doctrine of res judicata applies in divorce 
actions. Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303,305(Utah 
1985)• 'When there has been an adjudication, it becomes 
res judicata as to those issues which were either tried 
and determined, or upon all issues which the party had a 
fair opportunity to present and have determined in the 
other proceeding.'... However, the application of res 
judicata is unique in divorce actions because of the 
equitable doctrine which allows courts to reopen alimony, 
support, or property distributions if the moving party 
can demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances 
since the matter was previously considered by the 
court.... 
We must determine whether the subsequent legal 
recognition of retirement benefits as marital property 
subject to distribution in a divorce case is a 
substantial change of circumstances, thereby precluding 
the application of res judicata. Or more specifically, 
whether Woodward should be given retroactive effect." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Court in Throckmorton. supra, then examined a similar 
factual case in Arizona, Guffev v. LaChance, 127 Ariz 140, 618 P. 
2d 634 (Ariz Ct App. 1980) • In Guffey, supra, a wife sought to 
modify a seven and-one-half-year-old divorce decree in order to 
share in her former husband's military retirement benefits. The 
Utah court went on to say in Throckmorton at page 124: 
••.Nonetheless, the court(Arizona) denied the wife's 
request to modify, stating, '(t)here is a compelling 
16 
policy interest favoring the finality of property 
settlement' and this policy would be "greatly undermined 
if the court were to allow the potential for 
reexamination of every military divorce prior to the 
enactment of the rule'.. • 
•••We agree with the Arizona Court of Appeals, and find 
that legal recognition of a new category of property 
rights after a divorce decree has been entered is not 
itself sufficient to establish a substantial change of 
circumstances justifying a re-evaluation of a prior 
property division. Thus, we hold that the legal 
principles articulated in Woodward, should only be given 
prospective application. (Emphasis added.) 
Later this Court revisited the question of retirement benefits 
in Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) following and 
referring to Throckmorton, supra, stating at pages 716-717: 
Our opinion noted that res judicata 'is unique in 
divorce actions because of the equitable doctrine which 
allows courts to reopen alimony, support, or property 
distributions if the moving party can demonstrate a 
substantial change of circumstances since the matter was 
previously considered by the court.1 ... We noted that 
pension benefits were first recognized as marital assets 
in Utah in Woodward v Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) 
('Woodward I 1). Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 123. We then 
addressed the issue whether Woodward I should be given 
retroactive effect. Id. We ultimately determined that 
'legal recognition of a new category of property rights 
after a divorce decree has been entered, is not itself 
sufficient to establish a substantial change of 
circumstances justifying a reevaluation of the prior 
property division." Id at 124)" 
"In the instant case, appellant has articulated no 
change of circumstance justifying a reevaluation of the 
original property division. Appellant's claim of lack of 
knowledge of the retirement benefits does not constitute 
such a change. The only other possible change of 
circumstance is Woodward I's legal recognition of 
retirement benefits as marital assets. However, the 
decree of divorce was entered more than four years before 
the issuance of Woodward I and the modification order was 
entered a year before the issuance of Throckmorton. 
Inasmuch as Woodward I is to be given prospective 
application only, there is no appropriate basis on which 
to divide respondent's retirement account. Rather, we 
find the 'policy interest favoring the finality of 
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property settlement1 to be compelling. (Emphasis added.) 
The divorce decree in this case was rendered 8 years before 
Throckmorton, and 15 years before Plaintiff-Harris filed her 
Petition to Modify Decree. It was not a default or fraudulent 
divorce. Both parties were represented by counsel. The facts and 
the law as it then existed and the rights of each party were known 
and available to each party. A trial was held. The issues were 
litigated or could have been litigated. Res judicata bars the 
Plaintiff's petition to modify and the trial court so held.. 
Plaintiff-Harris misperceived and misapplies the broad concept 
of privity as it might apply to this case. A simple perusal of 
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, West Publishing Co. 1951, 
page 1361 defines privity as follows: 
PRIVITY. Mutual or successive relationship to the same rights 
of property.... Thus, the executor is in privity with the 
testator, the heir with the ancestor, the assignee with the 
assignor, the donee with the donor, and the lessee with the 
lessor.•• 
Glendon gave-assigned all of his rights to the retirement and 
401K plans to Theresa Spivey when he made her his beneficiary. 
(R.39-42.) Theresa is in privity with Glendon. She meets all of 
the requirements of Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah App. 
1978) and Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943). 
The court in Tanner v. Bacon, supra, states beginning at page 959: 
It is well settled that the doctrine of res adjudicata 
does not operate to affect strangers to a judgment; that it 
only affects the parties and their successors in interest, and 
those who are in privity with a party thereto.••.This court 
has defined the word "privity11 as a mutual or successive 
relationship to the same right or property. As applied to 
judgments or decrees of courts, the word means one whose 
interest has been legally represented at the time.(Emphasis 
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added•) 
This Court stated on the doctrine of res judicata in Trimble 
Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988) at 
page 453 as follows: 
The doctrine of res judicata has two separate but related 
branches which can be asserted as affirmative defenses... The 
first branch, now known as claim preclusion but referred to 
previously as "pure" res judicata, bars the relitigation by 
the parties or their privies of a claim for relief previously 
resolved by a final judgment on the merits...."The same rule 
also prevents relitigation of claims that could and should 
have been litigated in the prior action but were not."... 
The second branch of res judicata is collateral estoppel, 
or issues preclusion. Under this doctrine, the relitigation of 
factual issues that have one been litigated and decided is 
precluded even if the claims for relief in the two actions are 
different, • • • and even if only "the party against whom the 
doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to 
the prior adjudication...." (Emphasis added.) 
Clearly in the context of those pronouncements, Theresa Spivey 
is the successor to Glendon's interest. The divorce settled 
property interests of the parties. The court has spoken in 
Throckmorton that Woodward would only be applied prospectively in 
cases. Res judicata does apply in the present case. 
Plaintiff-Harris cites Carpenter v. Carpenter. 722 P 2d 230, 
150 Ariz. 52 (Ariz. 1986), in support of her claim that an ex-wife 
is entitled to pension benefits. That case is not applicable to the 
present case because Arizona is a community property state. The 
court in Carpenter,supra, only modified the decree in that case 
because of the property of the spouses was community property and 
the wife had a community property interest at the time of the 
divorce. Utah is not a community property state. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT A DIVORCE DECREE CANNOT BE MODIFIED AFTER THE DEATH OF ONE OF 
THE SPOUSES. 
Judge Schofield's Ruling at R. 147 states: 
While at first blush this point should be axiomatic, it 
merits fuller explanation. 
A divorce decree settles the rights of the two divorcing 
parties. In this case Bonnie and Glendon were divorced in May 
1980, some fifteen years before this modification proceeding 
was brought. At that time their respective interests in 
marital assets were determined. Now Bonnie asks that this 
Court modify that aged divorce decree. Yet, one of the parties 
is not present, nor can he be present as he died three months 
before the filing of this action. His property rights were 
fixed when he died. If Bonnie had any claim against him, it 
now would be a claim against his estate, not a claim to modify 
the divorce decree. Yet here she is asking this Court to 
ignore the fact of his death and determine the rights which 
she and Glendon have concerning a retirement benefit which 
accrued, if at all during a marriage which terminated fifteen 
years ago. 
Farrell v. Porter. 830 P.2d 299,301 (Utah App. 1992), 
quoted with approval from the older case of Nelson v. Davis, 
592 P.2d 594,597 (Utah 1979): 
When the death of one or both parties to a divorce action 
occurs during the pendency of the action, the action 
itself abates and their status, including their property 
rights, reverts to what it had been before the action was 
filed. 
If that language is accurate, then the death of Glendon 
abates any divorce modification proceeding. The rights of the 
parties thus are fixed at the status prior to the death. At 
that time Bonnie had no enunciated rights in Glendon*s 
retirement. I see no reason she should have any now. 
This case is different from Farrell as in Farrell the 
divorce was in process when Mr. Farrell died in a fishing boat 
accident while in this case Glendon's death occurred well 
before Bonnie brought her petition to modify. If Farrell and 
Nelson have meaning, it is that as between divorcing parties, 
property rights are fixed at the time of death and divorce 
cannot change or modify the effect of death in fixing property 
rights. If that is so in Farrell, it is more so in this case 
as Bonnie brought this action well after Glendon's death. Any 
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property rights which she may have had in common with Glendon 
were fixed and would need to be decided in the context of a 
probate of his estate, not by resort to a modification of the 
old divorce decree. (Footnote omitted.) 
The general rule is that an application to vacate a decree of 
divorce does not lie after the death of a party. There is a 
conflict of authority upon questions of whether a divorce decree 
can be vacated after the death of a party where property rights are 
involved. Property interests, within the foregoing rule, are 
interests the surviving spouse has been wrongfully deprived by the 
divorce, 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and Separation, Section 494. 
The present Spivey case would not qualify, even if Utah courts 
followed jurisdictions which allowed property interests to be 
considered after death of a party because there is no fraud, none 
was alleged in the Petition to Modify Divorce Decree (R.8.), nor 
was this a default. Both parties were represented by counsel and a 
trial held. Further, if a modification of a divorce decree were 
done, it would have to be done in the same case rather than in a 
separate case. Karren v. Karren, 25 Utah 87, 69 P 465 (Utah 1902). 
With Glendon's death the court in the original divorce proceeding 
lost jurisdiction over him. 
IV. APPELLANT-HARRIS1 PETITION DID NOT ALLEGE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES 
To modify a divorce decree the moving party must allege in the 
pleadings and prove changed conditions arising since the entry of 
the decree.Gale v. Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 P.2d 986 (Utah 1953), 
which cites Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 198 P.2d 233 (Utah 1948). 
Plaintiff- Harris1 Petition to Modify is void of any 
allegation of substantial changed circumstances. (R. 8) It merely 
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states that the original Divorce court Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree did not address the issue of 
retirement or 4OIK plans. 
State and Federal Statutes also indicate the Petition to 
Modify is without merit and lacks substance. 
A. STATE STATUTES: 
Glendon Spivey was a retired employee of the City of Provo and 
a member of the Utah State Retirement System. Benefits of members 
of that retirement system are governed and controlled by the Utah 
Retirement Act. (Utah Statutes Section 49-1-103(15).) 
Utah Code Section 49-1-606(1) states who are beneficiaries. 
It reads: 
(1) If a member marries or remarries. all beneficiary 
designations dated prior to the most recent marriage and 
filed with the retirement office shall be canceled and 
the spouse shall be the beneficiary unless a different 
beneficiary designation is executed on or after the date 
of the marriage and filed with the retirement office, in 
which case the designation of beneficiary shall be 
binding in the payment of any benefits which may be due 
under this title. (Emphasis added.) 
Theresa Spivey is the beneficiary of Glendon G. Spivey1s 
retirement and 401(k) plan benefits in two ways. 
First. Theresa is the beneficiary because Glendon G. Spivey 
designated her as the beneficiary by executing beneficiary forms on 
in 1990, and 1991.(R.41,42.) 
SECOND. Even without the execution of the beneficiary 
designation forms, Theresa G. Spivey is the beneficiary because all 
prior executed designations were canceled under Utah Code 49-1-
606(1), and as Glendon's spouse she is the beneficiary. 
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B. FEDERAL STATUTES: 
Although Glendon's 401(k) plan is administered by the Utah 
State Retirement Office, Federal Law controls how such plans 
operate. The Utah State Retirement Office Beneficiary Change Form 
Glendon signed contains the following wording. (R.42.) 
401 (k) DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN: In compliance with the 
National Retirement Equity act of 1984, if you are married, 
your primary beneficiary MUST be your spouse unless you 
provide us with a NOTARIZED written consent from your spouse 
authorizing another beneficiary and waiving any claim to the 
benefits of this program. (R.42. A Clearer copy of R.42 is 
attached to this brief as Addendum 1.) 
Bonnie-Harris1 affidavit of having poor health 10 or 15 years 
after a divorce is without merit, and was not part of the pleading. 
She remarried two years after the divorce. Support is alimony and 
alimony ends after remarriage. Her present husband is the one 
Plaintiff needs to look to for support. A change in health 10 and 
15 years after a divorce is not a change of circumstances to 
justify a modification of a property division in a divorce action 
where Plaint iff-Harris was represented by counsel and a trial held. 
Two following hypothetical examples illustrate the 
impracticality of subsequent poor health 10 and 15 years later 
justifying modifying a prior divorce property settlement, 
especially where the other spouse is now dead. Chaos in the courts 
would result. Every healthy party in a divorce who at some later 
date in life suffered a decline in health would be back in court 
seeking to modify the court property division. Divorce cases would 
never end. 
Hypothetical No. 1. The parties divorce. The husband-spouse in 
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the divorce dies. Fifty years later the other spouse develops poor 
health and files an action against the second wife to modify the 
divorce property division. 
Hypothetical No. 2. The movie star Elizabeth Taylor has, 
according to some press reports, been married 8 times to 6 or 7 
husbands. Other press reports state that Elizabeth has had poor 
health and been to medical centers for treatment. Could Elizabeth 
Taylor, now in her 60's expect the court to modify the property 
distribution in her first divorce which occurred 40 years ago while 
she was in her teens? What about the intervening husbands, and the 
style of living Elizabeth Taylor has followed in the intervening 
years? Are all of those divorces subject to being reopened and 
property distributions modified? 
Glendon Spivey was not the guarantor of Plaintiff-Harris1 
health 8 and 15 years after the divorce. 
The trial court weighed the matter of any change of 
circumstances. Judge Schofield states at page 6 of his Ruling: 
...A property distribution was made fifteen years ago and no 
compelling circumstances are alleged which justify reopening 
that property distribution. (R.148) 
CONCLUSION 
A trial court's Ruling and Order dismissing the Petition to 
Modify Divorce Decree is well supported by the facts and the law. 
This court should affirm that holding. 
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CROSS-APPEAL ON ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant Theresa G. Spivey should be awarded attorney fees 
under Rule 11, Sanctions and Utah Code 78-27-56. 
The court should be aware of some background matters which the 
record reflects to put this case in focus. 
1. Glendon 6. Spivey died December 27, 1994. (R. 3#13.) 
2. On December 29, 1994, two days after his death, Lisa 
Spivey, a daughter of decedent and Appellant-Bonnie Harris signed 
a petition to have herself appointed personal representative of 
Glendon• s estate. That petition was filed in the Fourth District 
Court, Utah County in probate case No. 943400572 on December 30, 
1994, about two hours before her father- Glendon Spivey's funeral. 
(R. 76, 44#10.) 
3. On January 11, 1995, Defendant-Theresa Spivey filed a 
counter-petition to have herself appointed personal representative. 
(R. 44#12.) 
4. Sidney S. Gilbert, CPA, was subsequently named personal 
representative by stipulation. (R. 44#12.) 
5. On March 31, 1995, 3 months after Glendon Spivey1s death 
and 15 years after the divorce with Glendon, Plaintiff-Harris filed 
the present case to modify the divorce decree. (R. 6.) Who is the 
attorney for Appellant/Defendant-Bonnie Harris? It is Charles A. 
Schultz, who is also attorney for Lisa Spivey in the probate 
proceeding. Who is the person signing many of the certificates of 
delivery in the present case? It is the same Lisa Spivey who filed 
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the probate proceeding even before her father's funeral. 
There appears to be a vendetta against Theresa Spivey, the 
surviving wife, attempting to get Glendon Spivey's assets which are 
needed by her and Wade, the young son of decedent and herself. 
Items I through III above (Items 1 through VI of the Theresa 
Spivey's Memorandum to Dismiss) clearly show Plaintiff's action is 
without merit. It was brought without good faith, and is an obvious 
effort by Plaintiff's counsel, who is also counsel for the children 
from decedent's first marriage, to harass and increase attorney 
fees of Theresa Spivey. Defendant, Theresa. 6. Spivey, should be 
awarded attorney fees for defending this action under Utah Code 78-
27-56 and Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION ON CROSS-APPEAL 
That portion of the trial court Ruling and Order which denied 
Theresa Spivey her attorney fees should be reversed. She should be 
awarded her attorney fees. 
Dated this 28th day of April, 1996. 
M. DAYLE JEFFS / /// 
Attorney for Defendant 
Theresa 6. Spivey 
l^U^f-?<L 
VERNON L. SNOW 
Attorney for Defendant 
Theresa 6. Spivey 
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